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ABSTRACT
On 25 November 2015, the European Union enacted new rules for 
international mobile roaming (IMR) under Regulation 2015/2120, 
which seeks to implement a Roam Like at Home (RLAH) regime 
among the member states of the European Union. Questions remain, 
however, as to whether it is possible to implement RLAH without 
mandating below-cost pricing and thus introducing significant 
regulatory and economic distortions.
It is difficult to see how RLAH could be implemented for other than 
trivial amounts of IMR traffic without significant cross-subsidisation 
of the IMR service in many different dimensions. Identifying ways to 
maintain the ubiquity of the IMR service without unduly distorting the 
economics of European mobile markets and networks would appear 
to pose serious challenges; the saving grace, however, might well be 
that IMR revenue now represents a small enough fraction of total 
mobile revenue (thanks to previous regulation) that the necessary 
cross-subsidies might be manageable. The European Commission, 
which is required to assess the situation and to provide legislative 
proposals by 15 June 2016, faces a daunting task.
Challenging prospects for 
roam like at home
J. Scott Marcus (scott.marcus@bruegel.org) is a Visiting Fellow at Bruegel. Georgios 
Petropoulos (georgios.petropoulos@bruegel.org) is a Research Fellow at Bruegel.
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1 Introduction 
 
International mobile roaming (IMR) is a service whereby a subscriber to mobile telecommunications 
services in one country is able to use his or her mobile device in other countries. For many years, 
governments around the world have expressed concerns that the prices of IMR services seemed to be 
unreasonably high compared to the price of domestic telecommunications services. These concerns 
have led to numerous regulatory initiatives, and to wholesale and retail IMR price controls in the 
European Union and also between the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council1. 
 
1.1 Motivation: the policy context in Europe today 
 
On 25 November 2015, the European Union enacted new rules for IMR under Regulation 2015/2120, 
which seeks to implement a roam like at home (RLAH) regime for EU member states2. In a pure RLAH 
regime, the price of roaming services would be the same as for equivalent domestic 
telecommunication services (ie mobile network operators (MNOs) would not be permitted to charge a 
premium for these services). 
 
Regulation 2015/2120 expresses a legitimate political objective; however, no robust means for 
delivering RLAH have been identified to date. 
 
The primary public policy rationale for RLAH is straightforward. High costs for calls and for internet data 
while travelling within the European Union, which seeks to function as an integrated free trade area 
(FTA), are incongruous, and can be viewed as an impediment to the functioning and efficiency of a 
European single market. 
 
As a secondary but minor rationale, high charges for IMR lead to losses of societal welfare in the form 
of welfare transfers and deadweight loss; however, as we explain in section 3, these losses are small 
for Europe as a whole. (Indeed, the incremental gains to static economic efficiency that could be 
achieved beyond those already achieved by the 2012 Regulation are miniscule.) 
 
The primary goal of RLAH would thus appear to be legitimate; the question remains, however, whether 
it is possible to implement RLAH without introducing problematic economic and regulatory distortions. 
Regulation 2015/2120 calls on the European Commission to report on the wholesale market for 
roaming, and to make legislative proposals to solve an economic problem that is in fact quite difficult 
to solve3. We return to these questions in section 5. 
 
                                                 
1  The European Union issued regulations in 2007, 2009, 2012, and most recently in 2015. The regulations approved by 
the ministers of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) in 
2015 implement wholesale and retails controls that are broadly similar to those in effect in Europe in 2012, as 
explained in J. Scott Marcus, Christin-Isabel Gries and Robert Clarke (2015).   
2  See European Union (2015). The Regulation also applies to European Economic Area (EEA) members Norway, Iceland, 
and Liechtenstein. 
3  Per Article 7 of the new Regulation (which amends the previous Roaming Regulation), this report and the accompanying 
legislative proposals are due by 15 June 2016. Recital 21 of the new Regulation notes that “… the ultimate aim of 
eliminating the difference between domestic charges and roaming charges cannot be attained in a sustainable manner 
with the observed level of wholesale charges. Therefore this Regulation sets out that retail roaming surcharges should 
be abolished from 15 June 2017, provided that the issues currently observed in the wholesale roaming markets have 
been addressed. In this respect, the Commission should conduct a review of the wholesale roaming market, and should 
submit a legislative proposal based on the outcome of that review.” 
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1.2 A further motivation: the global policy context 
 
Regulation of IMR at regional level is under way in a number of the world’s regional groupings. The GCC 
region has had regulation in place since 2013 for IMR calls made, and is (as previously noted) in an 
advanced stage of implementation of a new, comprehensive roaming regulation. Initiatives at various 
stages are ongoing in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the East African 
Community (EACO), Latin America and the West Balkans. 
 
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) issued a Recommendation on IMR in 2012 (ITU-T, 
2012). Possible revisions have been under discussion ever since. 
 
 
2 IMR data flows and payment flows 
 
The most intensively studied form of IMR, and perhaps the easiest to explain, is the case of a roamer 
subscribed to home network (HN) A in country A who visits country B and uses MNO B as a visited 
network (VN) to place a call (Figure 1). The roamer pays his or her home network in Country A. MNO B 
actually places the call on the roamer’s behalf, thus incurring both origination and termination costs, 
much as if its own subscriber had placed the same call. 
 
MNO B (the VN) receives no retail revenue for this service; however, it receives a payment at wholesale 
level from MNO A (the HN). This wholesale payment is often referred to in the literature as an inter-
operator tariff (IOT)4. 
 
Figure 1: Cash flows in IMR: calls made 
 
Source: ARCEP (France), 2006. 
 
The same basic principles apply to SMS messages sent while roaming, and to data; however, each 
service has its own idiosyncrasies. 
 
                                                 
4  MNOs sometimes distinguish between the nominal wholesale payment rate versus bilaterally agreed discounted rates, 
in which case the IOT generally refer to the nominal rate. 
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SMS messages are subject to the same general payment arrangements as calls made; however, the 
SMS is sent to from the VN to the HN as a control message (ie not as bearer traffic), and is then sent to 
its end destination by the HN5. 
 
Roaming data is subject to similar payment arrangements; however, the data is physically sent from 
the VN to the HN6 before being shipped to wherever it is needed by means of IP transit services7. This 
enables the HN to account for the data, and thus to bill for it. It may also enable the HN to apply rules, 
for instance to block content that is banned in the home country. 
 
For calls received (Figure 2), a significantly differently flow of traffic and payments comes into play. 
The call is effectively forwarded from the HN to the VN. The VN receives a normal payment of the 
international mobile termination rate (MTR), but receives no additional IOT payment (which suggests 
that the incremental cost of providing this IMR service cannot be very great). 
 
For calls received (whether domestic or international), the HN generally receives an MTR payment from 
the caller’s network8. The difference between the MTR received and the MTR paid is thus crucial in 
understanding the HN’s costs. Among EU member states, this difference is generally not more than 2 
eurocents today9, but internationally it can be much more. In this paper, we treat the MTR paid net of 
the MTR received as being the cost; one could, alternatively, treat the MTR received as being part of the 
IMR revenue. 
 
In most countries, the party receiving a call typically does not make a retail payment for it; however, 
roaming calls have historically been associated with retail charges10. 
 
                                                 
5  In most countries, there are no charges for receiving an SMS message while roaming. 
6  This data transmission could take place over a dedicated link or over a secure ‘tunnel’ over the public internet; however, 
it is more often done using a ‘hubbed’ solution to a multi-provider exchange point following standards developed by the 
GSM Association (GSMA). The current GSMA standard is the IP Exchange (IPX). 
7  In the future, LTE local break-out services (a technical capability that is related to but not synonymous with the local 
break-out (LBO) regulatory option introduced with Europe’s Roaming Regulation of 2012) might make it possible for the 
VN to ship IMR data off directly via IP transit services, without incurring a rather unproductive transit shipment to the 
HN. 
8  If the caller is on-net (ie is also a customer of the called party’s MNO), the MNO receives retail revenue instead of an 
MTR. 
9  European Commission, Digital Agenda Scoreboard. 
10  Under Regulation 2015/2120, these retail charges are to be prohibited. 
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Figure 2: Cash flows in IMR: calls received 
 
Source: ARCEP, 2006. 
 
Numerous roaming-specific charges can be relevant. These have been analysed in numerous 
studies11, but the results are often less than fully conclusive. Information about these costs is 
generally known only to the MNOs, if it is known at all. In practice, the MNOs might not have a full 
understanding of their own ‘soft’ costs, and also might not wish to report them. 
 
Different costs apply to the HN versus the VN, and not all IMR costs are relevant to each IMR service12. 
Among the costs relevant to the HN are: 
 
 Retail costs (including a proportionate share of the costs of customer acquisition and 
customer care); 
 Wholesale payments (IOTs) from the HN to the VN; 
 Roaming overhead costs; 
 Signalling; 
 International transit (where relevant); 
 Taxes (if relevant)13; 
 Origination, termination and other traffic-related costs (where relevant). 
 
It is generally impractical to differentially allocate retail costs to individual services; consequently, 
they are often assumed to represent either a constant percentage of retail revenue for all services, or 
else a constant percentage of the cost of generating that retail revenue 
 
Roaming overhead costs consist of a variety of administrative and network-related components that 
are entailed in maintaining the roaming service. These can include negotiation of agreements, testing, 
operations and maintenance (including accounting, payments, revenue assurance, fraud prevention, 
                                                 
11  See for instance Chapter 5 of J. Scott Marcus, Christin-Isabel Gries and Robert Clarke (2015); and Imme Philbeck, Jasper 
Mikkelsen and Werner Neu (2012).  
12  The discussion in this section closely follows the analysis in the previously cited study for the GCC, J. Scott Marcus et al 
(2015). 
13  Taxes rarely enter into the European IMR discussion, but different tax rates can be a significant consideration in other 
parts of the world. 
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dedicated staff costs, software and systems for roaming operations), data clearing, and financial 
clearing. 
 
The cost of signalling is in principle relevant to all roaming services in both home and visited networks; 
however, this cost is small. 
 
Some of these costs can be viewed as fixed annual costs, largely independent of traffic volumes. Their 
impact on unit costs can be greater for MNOs with low IMR traffic volumes. 
 
These costs vary greatly among European member states due to a range of underlying factors, notably 
including different labour costs. Even within a single member state, they can differ among the MNOs 
due for instance to the size of the network operator and related scale effects. In addition, the situation 
is substantially different for member states that are substantial tourist destinations, where MNOs tend 
to be net recipients of payments, versus for member states that tend to be net payers. These tourism 
effects can moreover be subject to considerable seasonal variation. 
 
 
3 Literature review 
 
The general literature on the interconnection of switched telephone networks largely derives from 
seminal works by Armstrong (1998) and by Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a and 1998b) , together with 
a sequel that generalises the work to deal with Internet interconnection (Laffont et al, 2003) We do not 
summarise the work here, since the Laffont, Rey and Tirole work permeates the rest of this paper14. 
 
Armstrong and Wright (2007) model fixed interconnection (with fixed termination rates (TRs) that are 
presumably always subject to regulation) and mobile interconnection (with mobile termination rates 
(MTRs) that are not necessarily subject to regulation), thus refining the earlier work15. 
 
Several subsequent studies have analysed the impacts of the regulation of IMR in the European 
Economic Area (EEA)/EU, and have explored alternative approaches to address over-pricing of IMR 
services16. Particularly noteworthy in this group is the Commission’s impact assessment in 
preparation for the 2012 Roaming Regulation17, which includes a thoughtful analysis derived from a 
study to which Steffen Hörnig contributed. Hörnig and his colleagues found the own price elasticity of 
demand18 for IMR calls made, calls received and SMS to all be in the -0.24 to -0.27 range, which is to 
say that demand for the services is relatively inelastic; however, the own price elasticity of demand for 
IMR roaming data was in the -1.23 range, which is to say that consumer demand for roaming data is 
relatively elastic19. 
 
                                                 
14  We generally cite their book, which concisely summarises the results of multiple papers; Jean-Jacques Laffont and 
Jean Tirole (2000). 
15  An annotated bibliography of the pre-2008 literature on network interconnection in telecommunications appears as an 
annex in J. Scott Marcus et al (2008). 
16  Among these are a study for the European Commission, J. Scott Marcus and Imme Philbeck (2010); and a short study 
for the European Parliament: J. Scott Marcus, Pieter Nooren and Imme Philbeck (2012). 
17  See European Commission (2011). 
18  The price elasticity of demand (PED) reflects the way in which demand for a product or service and corresponding 
consumption responds to changes in price. It is generally negative, because an increase in price results in a decrease 
in demand (and vice versa). A PED between zero and -1.0 indicates that demand is relatively inelastic (ie the response 
to changes in price is small); a PED that is greater in magnitude than -1.0 indicates an elastic demand, with a stronger 
response to changes in price. 
19  The mathematical specification of this work appears on pages 101 through 104 of the document. 
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It is possible that the price elasticity of demand for roaming voice services is higher today. In the past, 
even with regulation, the price was perceived as being too high – most Europeans placed calls while 
roaming only when unavoidable, both before and after the regulations came into force. We have 
argued, however, that when the price of calls made while roaming approached that of domestic calls, 
the price elasticity of demand for placing roaming calls could also be expected to be similar20. 
 
The same impact assessment21 also assesses the impact on societal welfare (in terms of static 
economic effects) of the changes already put in place up to that time. It compares a business-as-usual 
scenario, in which the price reductions already put in place by the 2009 Roaming Regulation continue 
without change, to an alternative (counterfactual) scenario in which the Roaming Regulation would 
have been discontinued, and prices would have returned to the previous unregulated levels. Compared 
to the counterfactual scenario, the continuation of regulation from 2012 to 2014 was calculated as 
increasing consumer surplus by €18.6 billion, while reducing industry profits (producer surplus) by €5 
billion. The difference of € 13.6 billion represents a net gain in societal welfare (ie a reduction in 
deadweight loss), and reflects increased consumption of IMR services22. 
 
As previously noted, a number of studies have attempted to quantify the actual wholesale and retail 
costs of providing IMR services. Two of our own studies featured prominently in section 2. 
 
For the current situation in Europe, BEREC (2014) can also be viewed as a significant contribution to 
the literature. We make reference to these BEREC findings in several places in this paper. BEREC 
(2014) starts from the obvious but sometimes overlooked proposition that (1) wholesale revenues to 
the VN should be at least as great as the associated costs, and that (2) retail revenues should be at 
least as great as the payments that the HN makes to the VN. As previously noted, including all these 
desirable elements under an RLAH regime seems doubtful at best. BEREC (2014) therefore attempts to 
systematically explore ways to mitigate the economic imbalances that flow from a pure RLAH regime, 
primarily by (1) reducing wholesale payments to levels that are low but still in excess of marginal cost; 
or (2) imposing fair-use limits (FULs) that limit the losses being imposed on MNOs, or by means of a 
combination of the two. 
 
 
4 Insights from the interconnection literature 
 
Relatively little has been published on the economics of international mobile roaming. This is perhaps 
a result of the complexity of the operation – as we saw in section 2, there are at least four distinct 
services of interest, with significantly different considerations at the VN level versus the HN level. 
 
A great deal of energy has been invested, by contrast, in understanding interconnection issues. For the 
comparatively simple points we would like to make in this paper, the core results and basic 
formulations that were already visible in the original work by Laffont, Rey and Tirole would appear to be 
sufficient. 
 
Numerous observations flow directly from the structure of payments between the HN and the VN, and 
from a comparison with the literature on network interconnection. 
                                                 
20  See J. Scott Marcus and Imme Philbeck (2010). 
21  European Commission (2011). This is again the work of Hörnig and his colleagues. 
22  The application of welfare economics to international mobile roaming is explained at some length in section 8.4 of the 
previously cited report for the six GCC countries, J. Scott Marcus, Christin-Isabel Gries and Robert Clarke (2015). See 
also European Commission (2011). 
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4.1 High prices can be expected with IMR, and are challenging to remedy 
 
The first is that a tendency to dual marginalisation is to be expected, leading to prices to end-users that 
are even higher than those that a vertically integrated profit-seeking monopolist would choose23. 
Consider international calls between two countries, each with a monopoly operator (and thus no 
competition for the same end-users, which corresponds to the typical roaming situation between the 
VN and the HN)24. As Laffont and Tirole (2000) note, “a noncooperative setting of access charges 
would necessarily result in the well-known double marginalization, each country adding its monopoly 
[mark-up] to its perceived marginal cost”25. 
 
We emphasise that if the HN and VN were competing for the same end-users, one would not expect 
double marginalisation to emerge. This assumption is crucial.  
 
Dual marginalisation leads to end-user prices that exceed even the monopoly price, and are thus 
above the economically optimal price for the network operators. The problem is not easy to correct, 
even for the network operators in question (which probably explains why high IMR pricing has been 
difficult to correct in general). Dual marginalisation can be ameliorated somewhat if one of the 
monopolists acquires the other, or if they are permitted to set prices cooperatively – in that case, the 
end-user pays ‘only’ the monopoly price. Otherwise, regulation would appear to be the most practical 
alternative to high prices. 
 
With voice interconnection, even small network operators have market power over termination to the 
extent that typically there is no other network operator that can complete calls to their end-user’s 
telephone number. In fact, smaller network operators tend to have greater ability to exercise their 
market power than large network operators, because the termination rates charged by small operators 
tend to have less impact on the prices that consumers pay than the termination rates charged by large 
operators (assuming that retail prices are affected by average wholesale payments rather than 
network-specific termination payments)26. High prices tend to reduce traffic volumes because of the 
price elasticity of demand; however, to the extent that a small network has only a small impact on the 
price paid by end-users who wish to reach its end-users, a small network tends to be less 
economically constrained than a large one in the access price that it can charge. 
 
These considerations also apply to IMR, albeit imperfectly. The VNs typically do not have perfect 
monopoly control over visitors; nonetheless, they probably possess considerable pricing power. In 
Europe (and in most countries), it is rare to have more than four MNOs. Each HN could in principle 
choose one (or more) of these four for each visited country to which its roamers travel. One might 
therefore well imagine that prices charged to the HN would reflect oligopoly prices with up to four 
market participants, which would not necessarily differ greatly from competitive prices. In practice, 
however, it is often the case that one or more MNOs (1) have only limited geographic coverage, or (2) 
do not support all of the mobile connectivity options desired by the HN’s customers (for instance, 
support only 2G and 3G but not 4G mobile connectivity); or (3) possess networks that do not offer the 
quality or speed that the HN desires. The number of realistic choices is therefore more likely to reflect 
an oligopoly situation rather than perfect competition. 
 
                                                 
23  See Laffont and Tirole (2000), section 5.3 (in a chapter written with Patrick Rey). They refer to this form of over-pricing 
as the chain of monopolies or pancaking problem. 
24  As we explain shortly, this condition is not fully met, but competition for roaming services is weak. 
25  Laffont and Tirole (2000), page 184. They explain the underlying drivers, and reference an extensive literature 
addressing this point. 
26  See again Laffont and Tirole (2000), page 186. 
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The practical reality might be considerably worse. Roaming can be thought of as a multi-stage game, in 
which the HN initially chooses its VN partner(s) in a given visited country, then the roamer effectively 
chooses a VN from among those supported by its HN in the visited country (in most cases, the handset 
makes this choice automatically based on steering preferences downloaded from the HN to the 
handset), and only then does the end-user choose how much use to make of the service. Beyond this, 
the HN’s ability to steer traffic to its preferred VN is limited by numerous practical considerations, and 
especially by any gaps in coverage of a particular VN. Under these circumstances, the flow through of 
wholesale competition into end-user retail prices might well be attenuated. 
 
The effectiveness of wholesale bargaining is in any case not altogether clear. Market players claim that 
there is intense negotiation over wholesale prices, sometimes leading to prices discounted as much as 
40 percent below regulated European wholesale price caps27. The negotiations between MNO multi-
country groups could be complex, since each could offer to steer roamers to the other in one country or 
another. 
 
At the same time, assuming that the prices are symmetric (as appears to often be the case), then the 
prices for voice roaming services only matter for unpaired minutes. If MNO A is both an HN and a VN in 
country A, and MNO B an HN and VN in country B, and each steers some or all of its roamers to the 
other, then the only minutes that result in a net payment are those to which roaming minutes 
consumed by MNO A roamers in country B exceed those consumed by MNO B roamers in country A (or 
vice versa) – since the other minutes net to a zero payment, the rate charged for them is irrelevant. For 
purposes of the quarterly statistics that BEREC generates (see for instance BEREC, 2016), the MNOs 
generally report the paired minutes at a high rate (in Europe, typically the wholesale price cap rate), 
thus making the average wholesale payments for all minutes appear higher than the unit prices for 
unpaired minutes (BEREC, 2016). In other words, wholesale negotiations may possibly be somewhat 
more effective than most experts have assumed based on the BEREC statistics. 
 
It is also important to note that wholesale prices for data roaming have consistently been significantly 
below the regulated cap (BEREC, 2016). This voluntary decision of network operators may possibly 
represent a response to market forces, and especially to the higher price elasticity of demand for 
roaming data services compared to other roaming services (ie calls and SMS). 
 
For any given pair of MNOs and countries, one MNO will tend to be a net payer, the other a net receiver. 
Their negotiating interests are not aligned. The net payer will prefer a low wholesale price, the net 
receiver a high price. 
 
Taking all of this together, it is not surprising that both wholesale and retail prices are high in practice in 
the absence of regulation. This is clear in the statistics published by BEREC where regulated wholesale 
and retail prices tend to be just below the price caps (except to some degree in the case of data 
roaming), and where unregulated ‘bargain’ prices are actually on average above the caps. Competitive 
forces appear to be weak. As BEREC notes “… [f]or voice roaming services, average EEA prices are 
close to the regulated caps. This suggests that providers see little attraction in competing on Eurotariff 
rates, despite the fact that there is a significant margin between typical wholesale prices and retail 
caps”. 
 
  
                                                 
27  This emerged in multiple interviews, as reported in J. Scott Marcus and Imme Philbeck (2010). 
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4.2 Wholesale payments influence the retail price 
 
If both (1) wholesale unit charges for IMR and (2) the volume of roaming traffic between MNOs A and B 
in countries A and B were symmetric, one might well imagine that the wholesale charges would be 
totally irrelevant to retail pricing, since they would net to zero; in practice, however, they are highly 
relevant to retail pricing. Suppose, for instance, that MNO A were to choose to lower its roaming prices 
in order to win more business from country A roamers who travel in country B (ie to attract them when 
they choose to make a subscription). To HN MNO A, the wholesale payment to VN MNO B is a real cost 
(assuming that the MNOs are not affiliated). MNO A will therefore tend to view its payment to MNO B as 
a key component of its real marginal cost, and is unlikely to set its retail price below its real marginal 
cost. 
 
In the case of voice roaming and where the MNOs distinguish between paired and unpaired minutes 
(see section 4.1), it is the wholesale charge for the unpaired minutes that influences the retail price. 
 
Assume (without loss of generality) that MNO A does not offer retail services in country B, nor MNO B in 
country A. Under these circumstances, one can make a straightforward economic argument that the 
societally optimal wholesale rate is equal to marginal cost (ignoring network effects)28. If, however, 
one assumes that both fixed and marginal costs must be recovered, including joint and common costs 
associated with operating the network as a whole, then there is an argument to be made that higher 
mark-ups are needed to recover those costs. 
 
The question of whether joint and common costs should be recovered in general is largely an open 
question in the literature, but the European institutions have resolved the matter in the case of the 
RLAH provisions of Regulation 2015/2120. Article 6d(3)(a) of the regulation explicitly states that “... 
the determination of the overall actual and projected costs of providing regulated retail roaming 
services by reference to the effective wholesale roaming charges for unbalanced traffic and a 
reasonable share of the joint and common costs necessary to provide regulated retail roaming 
services” (emphasis added). 
 
If the two MNOs happen to operate in the same country, and thus to compete for the same end-user 
customers, then they tend to have an additional incentive to maintain high wholesale rates. For 
reasons just noted, the retail price is unlikely to be less than the wholesale payment; thus, high 
wholesale payments effectively raise a rival’s costs, and weaken competition between them for the 
same end-user consumers29. Under suitable assumptions, both benefit. 
 
4.3 Social welfare implications 
 
As noted in section 3, a credible estimate of the welfare effects of continuing the Roaming Regulation 
as it was versus eliminating it altogether between 2012 and 2014 found that elimination would have 
increased industry profits by €5 billion at the expense of consumers, and also would have increased 
deadweight loss (thereby reducing societal welfare) by an additional €13.6 billion based on reduced 
consumption of IMR services resulting from the higher price (European Commission, 2011). 
 
                                                 
28  See Laffont and Tirole (2000), page 197. When one takes network effects into account, the societally the optimal price 
(disregarding any dynamic impact on investment) is arguably below marginal cost. See also Armstrong and Wright 
(2007). 
29  See for instance Laffont and Tirole (2000), page 190-195. 
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These may sound like large numbers, but it is important to bear in mind that in a European Union of 
some 508 million inhabitants, this works out to about €9 per person per year. Moreover, this was a 
comparison based on the prices of the 2009 regulation versus previous unregulated prices. The prices 
in place in early 2016 were much lower, and have just become lower still under the new rates that 
came into effect on 30 April 2016 as a result of Regulation 2015/2120. The societal welfare difference 
between RLAH versus the new regulated rates is probably less than €1 per year per inhabitant. 
 
As a related matter, the societal welfare impact of RLAH will be more important for some services than 
for others. Societal welfare gains come mainly from increased consumption thanks to the price 
elasticity of demand. SMS is, however, a service that is in global decline, possibly because of 
competition from over-the-top services30. The logic of promising increased usage is thus questionable. 
For calls made and calls received (and also for SMS), the impact of lower prices is limited because of 
the fairly low price elasticity of demand (see section 3). For roaming data, however, there is the 
opportunity to facilitate use of a growing service, arguably the service of the future; moreover, the 
impact of price reductions is likely to be significant in light of a relatively high price elasticity of 
demand (again, see section 3). 
 
 
5 Challenges in implementing Roam Like at Home 
 
As noted in section 1.1, it is by no means clear whether it is possible to implement RLAH without 
introducing problematic economic and regulatory distortions. The discussion throughout this paper, 
reflecting both practical considerations concerning the costs of providing the service and theoretical 
insights from the economic literature, should make clear why this is so. It has always been clear that 
the provision of IMR services entailed costs beyond those associated with domestic services. Some of 
these costs fall to the Home Network (the HN, i.e. the MNO that serves the subscribed end-user in the 
Home Country), while others fall to the Visited Network (the VN, i.e. the MNO that serves the subscribed 
end-user in the Visited Country). These costs have widely been assumed to be small relative to the 
total cost of providing the IMR service, but they are not well understood.31 There is in our judgment 
substantial risk that the implementation of the new Regulation might introduce distortions and 
inconsistencies between the price and the cost of IMR services. Indeed, a 2014 study by the Board of 
European Regulators of Electronic Communications (BEREC) questioned whether RLAH could ever be 
“sustainable or feasible in practice”.32 
 
The regulations of 2007, 2009, and 2012 took great pains to ensure adherence to the principle that, in 
the words of BEREC (2014), “wholesale roaming caps should at least be at the level of the cost of 
providing domestic services (which costs vary between Member States)” (BEREC, 2014). Retail prices 
for the HN were always set at levels sufficiently in excess of the wholesale payment to the VN 
(frequently referred to as the Inter-Operator Tariff or IOT) to enable the HN to achieve a reasonable 
                                                 
30  An over-the-top (OTT) service is an online service that can be regarded as potentially substituting for traditional 
telecommunications and audiovisual services such as voice telephony, SMS, video on demand and television. See 
J. Scott Marcus (2016, forthcoming).  
31  See for instance J. Scott Marcus, Christin-Isabel Gries and Robert Clarke (2015). See also J. Scott Marcus, Imme 
Philbeck, Jasper Mikkelsen, and Werner Neu (2012). The European Commission has tasked a group of outside experts 
with the job of estimating these costs. They appear to be taking a generally sensible approach, but this is a difficult 
problem – whether they can obtain solid results in the end remains to be seen. In any event, even a rigorous knowledge 
of the costs would not in and of itself provide a means of bringing prices in line with costs. 
32  “BEREC’s analysis of the risks and impacts of the European Parliament’s RLAH proposals demonstrates that the removal 
of retail roaming surcharges across Europe is not currently sustainable or feasible in practice, given the significant 
variations in a number of important parameters across Member States, including (but not limited to) the levels of retail 
tariffs, costs, and travelling and consumption patterns” (BEREC, 2014). 
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profit. Even in the first Roaming Regulation in 2007, policymakers were worried that if prices were 
regulated to levels below cost, the IMR service would no longer be widely offered. It was possible to 
simultaneously satisfy these objectives as long as it was permissible to maintain retail IMR prices 
somewhat in excess of typical domestic prices. Now that Regulation 2015/2120 seeks to prohibit any 
premium at all from being charged, it is doubtful that these goals can still be fully met. 
 
Finding a solution is not easy. As BEREC (2016) noted, (1) roaming challenges cannot be solved solely 
by adjustments to roaming wholesale and retail prices, but need to also reflect call termination rates; 
and (2) it seems unlikely that any single set of wholesale roaming rates under an RLAH regime can 
simultaneously be low enough and high enough to prevent various kinds of harm33. 
 
The exact consequences of a failure to find a robust solution are difficult to predict, but many 
possibilities are conceivable: 
 
 If wholesale prices are capped at levels below the marginal cost of providing the IMR service, 
some MNOs might no longer offer the service as VNs. 
 If domestic retail prices are effectively capped at levels below the IOT payment to the VN (plus 
a minimally adequate profit), some MNOs might no longer offer the IMR service (perhaps 
selectively to high price or off-net VNs). 
 There will be a tendency for MNOs to increase their domestic mobile prices because of so-
called waterbed effects (where a network operator seeks to compensate for mandated 
reductions in the price of one component of its service by means of increases in other 
components). The loss on roaming services is included in their overall costs, and is reflected in 
the prices that they charge. This has the fringe benefit that it enables them to charge slightly 
higher prices for IMR services. 
 Costs and prices of mobile services vary greatly in different member states. Many MNOs have 
expressed valid concerns about ‘permanent roaming’, where an end-user obtains a mobile 
service in a member state where mobile prices are low and uses it without limit in a member 
state where mobile prices are high. These concerns could be mitigated by means of fair-use 
limits (or FULs, see for instance BEREC, 2014), but it is unclear whether a limit can be found 
that is simultaneously large enough to be useful to roaming consumers and small enough to 
prevent arbitrage that might be harmful to the MNOs. 
 To date, the objective of European policy has been simultaneously to reduce IMR prices and to 
maintain consistent IMR price caps across the member states. Whether this is possible in a 
regime in which prices are fully reduced to domestic levels remains to be seen. 
 Taking all of this into account, it is difficult to see how RLAH could be implemented for other 
than trivial amounts of IMR traffic without significant cross-subsidisation of the IMR service. 
Identifying ways to maintain the ubiquity of the IMR service without unduly distorting the 
economics of European mobile networks would appear to pose challenges; the saving grace, 
however, might well be that IMR revenue now represents a small enough fraction of total 
mobile revenue that the necessary cross-subsidies might possibly be manageable today. 
 
                                                 
33  BEREC (2016). “A range of measures suggested by some MNOs and MVNOs (such as converging mobile termination 
rates (MTRs) and lower wholesale caps) are needed to ensure that their domestic tariffs schemes are sustainable in a 
RLAH environment. … The challenge is finding a balance between wholesale charges that are sufficiently low to allow 
for a sustainable suppression of retail roaming surcharges, protect competition and avoid significant retail price 
increases in the home country, and sufficiently high to allow efficient cost recovery and return on investments to 
visited network operators to avoid retail price increases in the visited network and avoid a negative impact on MVNO 
competition in the visited markets. As there is no uniform wholesale tariff that would satisfy those conditions in every 
Member State, this is likely to involve a trade-off …”. 
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6 Concluding observations 
 
Relative to global considerations, the lessons that can be drawn from the related literature on 
interconnection seem to be sufficiently straightforward: 
 
 That IMR prices tend to be high in the absence of regulation is not an aberration, but rather an 
expected economic consequence of the nature of the service. 
 Initiatives to reduce IMR costs at regional level appear to offer promise in terms of regional 
integration and economic gains in societal welfare. 
 Policy needs to reflect the reality that wholesale and retail prices are linked. 
 Successful implementations to date have ensured (1) that the VN is permitted to earn 
wholesale revenues in excess of its corresponding costs, and (2) that the HN is permitted to 
earn retail revenues in excess of its corresponding costs (ie its wholesale payments to the VN. 
 
Relative to the implications for Europe, what is clear to date is that it is difficult if not impossible to fulfil 
the last point (avoiding making the IMR service unprofitable) while fully implementing an RLAH regime. 
The European institutions face substantial challenges. 
 
Taking all of this into account, it is difficult to see how RLAH could be implemented for other than trivial 
amounts of IMR traffic without significant cross-subsidisation of the IMR service. Identifying ways to 
maintain the ubiquity of the IMR service without unduly distorting the economics of European mobile 
networks would appear to pose challenges; the saving grace, however, might well be that IMR revenue 
now represents a small enough fraction of total mobile revenue that the necessary cross-subsidies 
may be manageable. 
 
Our intent here has not been to identify a solution, but rather to clarify the boundaries of the problem to 
be addressed. 
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